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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STYLE-CRETE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10902 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The State of Utah, plaintiff and appellant herein, 
respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing on the 
following grounds: 
1. The court's decision treats issues of fact as if 
they were issues of law. 
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2. The effect of the decision was to deprive the 
State of the right to introduce evidence as to compara-
bility. 
3. The decision fails to clarify the law relating to 
the effect of availability of other property and will tend 
to encourage future litigation. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was an appeal from a judgment in consoli-
dated condemnation proceedings. The primary issue on 
appeal was the right of the State to introduce evidence 
that other property was available to replace all or part 
of that severed by the condemnation and construction 
of the improvement. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
This court held that evidence of the availability 
of other property was properly rejected by the trial 
court because the property was not "comparable" and 
would not be a "useable substitute." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the trial of this case the condemnee placed 
great emphasis on the fact that an 8.262-acre parcel 
of property lying east of the new 23rd West Street 
(Parcel "C"), because of the elevation of the street, 
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could not be used with the remaining property upon 
which a pre-cast concrete plant was located (Parcel 
"B"). 
There was other testimony that damage would 
result to the property because of the severance of a 
.53-acre parcel of property lying to the south of the 
concrete plant and fronting on 5th South Street (Parcel 
"A"). 
It was never seriously urged at the trial, in 
the briefs, or in the argument on appeal that severance 
of Parcel "A" from the concrete plant would, in itself, 
be sufficient to require the condemnee to abandon its 
p~operty as an industrial or a pre-cast concrete manu-
facturing site. There was testimony that because of 
the severance of Parcel "C" from the concrete plant, 
the curing area would be too small, and Parcel "B" 
would be of such size that it could no longer be used 
for any other types of manufacturing. 
In this context, the state sought to introduce evi-
dence that Arnold Machinery Company owned and 
would have sold a parcel of property lying west of the 
plant site which was comparable in size, soil, and topog-
raphy to severed Parcel "C". In its decision, however, 
the court compared the Arnold Machinery Company 
property with Parcel "A" rather than Parcel "C'', and 
held that it is not comparable because a IO-acre tri-
angular piece would not effectively substitute for the 
one-half acre piece severed by the railroad right-of-way. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
The court's decision treats issues of fact as if they 
were issues of law. 
One of the primary problems facing litigants in 
condemnation cases i.s to determine, in addition to the 
value of property taken, the extent to which the taking 
and construction of the improvement affects values of 
remaining property. One of the factors to be taken into 
account by a jury is the availability of comparable 
property to replace that severed. The question of "com-
parability" like the question of "availability", is one 
of fact, to be determined on the basis of evidence. The 
facts represent a portion of the full and complete 
inquiry necessary to determine the condemnee' s dam-
ages insofar as they are reflected in the costs of "rehabili-
tation, rearrangement, restoration, and readjustment" 
of the remaining property. As pointed out in State 
Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate, 140 N.W.2d 
680 ( S.D., 1966) : 
"In estimating damages to the remainder, or 
in other words, the depreciation in value of the 
part not taken, the land owner is entitled to have 
the jury appraised as to all those facts which 
legitimately bear upon the market value * * * 
before and after the taking, and those factors 
that would ordinarily influence a prospective 
customer in negotiating for the property. 
" * * * it is proper to take into consideration 
the expenses made necessary by the improve-
ment * * * in order to restore the land to its most 
4 
advantageous use, or in adjusting it to the 
changed conditions brought about by the taking 
* * *" 
That the question of comparability is a fact issue 
is well recognized by the authorities and the cases. We 
have been unable to find any cases in which it has 
seriously been contended that these are law questions 
to be decided by the court without evidence. See Pima 
County et al. v. De Concini et ux., 79 Ariz. 154, 285 
P .2d 609, 6 ll ( 1955), and the other authorities cited 
in the appellant's reply brief in this case. 
The court has assumed, absent any evidence, that 
a triangular "?arcel of property is not comparable to 
· an adjacent square parcel of similar size, soil, and 
topography. The court may not take judicial notice of 
this kind of a fact (78-25-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1953). 
We submit that the question of comparability is a 
fact question, to be determined on the basis of evidence 
submitted to the trial court. Only when evidence as to 
comparability and the effect of the availability of other 
land upon the market price is given a full consideration 
can the parties be deemed to have had a fair trial on 
issues fairly made. 
II 
The effect of the decision was to deprive the state 
of the right to introduce evidence as to comparability. 
The condemnee' s case at the trial included the 
theory that great damages resulted from the fact that 
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Parcel "C" was separated from Parcel "B" by the 
slightly elevated 23rd West Street, and that because 
of this, the property north of the plant would be too 
small to support a pre-cast concrete or any other manu-
facturing operation. 
In cross examining McCowan Edward Hunt, an 
expert in concrete manufacturing, counsel for the State 
attempted to go into the question of camparability of 
the Arnold Machinery Company property with the 
property identified as Parcel "C". The following 
occurred at page 456 of the record: 
"Q. The third [factor}, as I understand, would 
be-well, from here, would be the construction 
of this road, which prevents access into the east 
portion for storage? 
A. Yes, eliminates their storage and, of course, 
impedes their-the bad thing about it, these peo-
ple are handling heavy loads and frequently 
some, a trailer load, that is maneuvering in this 
limited space as I see it is very difficult. 
Q. You've been on this property a number of 
times, haven't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with the property that lies 
on the west of Style-Crete's property and be-
tween their boundary and the surplus canal? 
A. Yes, sir. I have seen it. 
Q. Now, from an engineering standpoint, 
would that property be a satisfactory substitute 
for the property on the east? 
.l\IR. CAMPBELL: Ob;ection, if the court 
please. That has nothing to do with any issue 
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before the court. Engineering wise or market 
value wise. 
MR. ROE: I'll submit it. We've already 
argued this a little to Your Honor, so, you know 
what the position is, I think. 
MR. CAMPBELL: The question was, Your 
Honor, whether the land to the west would be 
as functional, as I understand the question of 
counsel, that the land to the west would be as 
functional and the use ofthe plant of Style-
Crete as the property that is to the east of 2300 
West. And there is no law in this jurisdiction 
that can possibly require a citizen to go out and 
buy other land. And in attempt to repair and 
substitute the damage which the government or 
the state has occurred. * * * 
THE COURT: Objection will be sustained. 
* * * The basis is at this point there has been 
no showing of availability of land on the west 
side" (emphasis added). 
It will be seen that the state attempted to inquire 
into the comparability of the Arnold Machinery Com-
pany property, and the extent to which the problems 
described by witness Hunt might be cured by the acqui-
sition of that property. The trial court refused to permit 
evidence of the availability of other property, osten-
sibly on th eground that there had been no evidence 
that other property was available (although objection 
was based upon the ground that this was not material, 
because there was no duty to acquire property). 
Nevertheless, when the state attempted to introduce 
evidence respecting the availability of other property 
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the trial court excluded it on the ground that the evi-
dence was not material. Then came the decision of the 
court, holding that evidence of the availability of other 
property was properly excluded because the property 
was not comparable. Understandably, the representa-
tives of the state feel as if they were caught in a revolv-
ing door. 
III 
The decision fails to clarify the law relating to the 
effect of availability of comparable property and will 
encourage future litigation. 
The court's decision, by holding in substance that 
the question of comparability of property can be deter-
mined by the court without the introduction of evidence, 
tended to obscure an important legal principle. Both 
condemnors and condemnees should be given some 
guidance as to the factors properly to be considered 
in determining severance damages. As it stands, the 
decision in this case is likely to lead to an inability on 
the part of the condemnor and the condemnee to reach 
any agreement upon such damages. Surely additional 
litigation and guesswork will follow. 
Depite the trial court's deaf ear, perhaps it can be 
urged that the failure of the state to prove that the 
property was comparable, or to continue to make offers 
of proof in connection with it, the error in rejection 
of the evidence was "harmless." But if this is the case, 
it would be beneficial to all concerned if the court 
would say so, instead of leaving an important principle 
under a decisional cloud. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this case the trial court was unduly restrictive in 
the scope of permitted cross examination, and though 
not assigned M such, the refusal to permit complete 
testing of the factors upon which opinions of the con-
demnee' s experts were based was error. Possibly the 
error originally was not fundamental; but when the 
court refused evidence of comparability and availability, 
it effectively deprived the state of an opportunity to 
pove that the condemnee did not suffer the damage 
claimed. 
In its decision on appeal this court mistakenly 
assumed that the property was meant as a substitute 
for Parcel "A"; and determined the question of com-
parability without benefit of evidence. 
A rehearing should be granted, the judgment of 
the trial court reversed, and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
BRYCE E. ROE 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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